









































































Underdetermination, Multiplicity, and Mathematical Logic

I. The claim: Mathematical Logic supports Underdetermination 
That data do not serve to uniquely determine theories, or, that there are always many theories consistent with any collection of data has long been one of the more provocative and stimulating questions in the History and Philosophy of Science​[1]​. This issue has traditionally been called the ‘underdetermination of theories by data’, a label which focuses attention upon data; it is equivalent to the claim that , for any given collection of data, many explanations exist. As the latter version emphasis the multiplicity of possible explanations, which is of greater interest, I shall hereafter refer to the question as  “Multiplicity”. While the discussion of Multiplicity (underdetermination) has been conducted in both historical and philosophical terms, I will argue that certain data from Mathematics, particularly from Mathematical Logic, greatly strengthen our confidence in Multiplicity. In issues of such complexity our arguments are seldom decisive but rather try to shift the balance of plausibility in a given direction. The results of Mathematical Logic provide a definite tilt in favor of ‘underdetermination’ and Multiplicity. The argument is based on Science being expressed as an axiomatic system; this tilts it towards modern physics, but what is lost in generality is gained in precision.
This ‘under-determination of theories by data’ poses a severe problem if we believe we can approach truth by the patient iteration that is the epitome of  scientific progress. Multiplicity tells us that no matter how many data we explain with a theory, there are always other potential theories that will serve to explain the same data​[2]​. If we call the theory that explains given empirical data the 'model' generating those data, then the claim is that "multiple models always exist." This poses a conundrum. If several different models are equally explanatory of the known data, which are we to choose? What is it then that led us to choose a particular model?​[3]​ Is it politics, philosophy, culture or economics?​[4]​
Let us try a simpler problem first. Suppose we write down the rules for playing tick-tack-toe, also called ‘noughts and crosses’. Then we wander the world with these rules in hand and ask everyone and every people we meet, ‘Do you know of a game that obeys these rules?’. Suppose someone says ‘yes’. Will the game they present us be tick-tack-toe, except for, say, their use of  triangles and squares instead of knots and crosses? We can actually prove that indeed every such game will be tick-tack-toe. Such models are called categorical models and when they exist we have good grounds for saying that we can uniquely model the phenomenon in question (tick-tack-toe in our case). When a logical system is not categorical, more than one ‘reality’ satisfies the rules of the system,-- the axioms​[5]​. At least since the work of Thorlaf Skolem around 1920 logicians have known that categorical models are very rare and scarcely exist for any model of real interest.​[6]​ 
Section 2 deals with the requirements imposed by Science; finding an unambiguous language, setting valid Interpersonal rules for discussion in this language, the need for mathematics (and logic) and the difficulties of translating ‘data’ into theories in such a framework. It was said of Maxwell's theories that "Maxwell's theory is the system of  Maxwell's equations"​[7]​---we need to appreciate the Implications of this move on the part of 20th century science. Section 3 presents the relevant ideas from logic and notes how logicians have despaired over getting a unique model of Set Theory. If mathematics is the basis for physics and if mathematics supports multiplicity, there is even more reason to expect physics to do so. Section 4 points out that  alternative models do exist in several cases, but do not generate enough philosophical attention, and suggests reasons why multiplicity is not pursued more avidly. The conclusion gathers the earlier strands and provides a synthetic statement. 
My own motivation comes from considering the state of Economics, a subject which has tried to build upon an axiomatic foundation, but whose bases can be best described as ‘wide’---meaning that many alternative axioms spring readily to mind---rather than ‘deep’, as in the physical sciences, where we build from bases we have no ready intuition about. It needs only two alternative hypotheses to generate heated debate and economics seems to have no trouble providing a plentitude of topics where such alternatives arise​[8]​. For example, is the structure of the economy such that an increase in the money supply is followed by inflation or is the structure such that higher inflation produces an increase in the money supply? If Multiplicity holds, there is continual scientific ground for policy debate.​[9]​ Philosophers and sociologists of Science have made this explicit for Physics, as in the writings of sociologists of Science​[10]​, but the implications for Social Science are more significant.​[11]​ However, such considerations are foreign to the rest of this paper, where I try to focus solely upon modern physical science
II. Communicating  Science: the need for Mathematics
The idea that our scientific theories are mere mental constructs is already implicit in the  phrase, popularised in the Middle Ages but probably ancient, describing scientific activity as consisting of ‘saving the appearances’. It was certainly accepted by many in the 18th century and Adam Smith speaks of all scientific explanations as being ‘imaginary’.​[12]​ In modern times, Multiplicity was  posed by Pierre Duhem almost as an aside, “Shall we ever dare to assert that no other hypothesis is imaginable?  Light may be a swarm of projectiles, or it may be a vibratory motion whose waves are propagated in a medium; is it forbidden to be anything else at all.”​[13]​ But this does not lead Duhem to argue for Multiplicity. Thus Duhem quotes Poincare to the effect that there are several equally ‘empirical’ theories of light, but goes on to argue that it is illegitimate to consider them as equally good.
Some influential philosophers of Science, such as Mary Hesse and Norman Campbell, believe that theories arise by analogy from our common experience. Both the expression of the analogy and its  persuasiveness can only come about in a natural language.---the natural language allows us to  anchor theory to ‘fact’, and to bring out the importance of context​[14]​. Since language is naturally ambiguous, we cannot expect theories which completely and uniquely capture our experience of reality through such a process..​[15]​ The use of language necessarily introduces ambiguity, and ambiguity encourages, perhaps even necessitates, a multiplicity of world views. The anti-realist conclusion follows directly: “How can we be sure that they[theoretical data] provide a firm empirical foundation? The answer must be that we cannot be sure.” As long as we require ordinary language in an essential way, there Is no escape from some ambiguity.
Science must be communicable knowledge​[16]​. Knowledge that cannot be communicated is intuition. The constraint of communicability is a binding constraint. The reliability of science is assured in standard stories of scientific method because we are all tied down to the same pegs by having to rely upon replicable experiments for our data. One can attack the impersonal truth of science by denying the assurances supposedly provided by replicable experiments. Effective criticisms of the “accurately known fact” and the “replicable experiment” have come from many, such as N R Hanson, Paul Feyerabend, Giora Hon, Jolly Mathen, Harry Collins and Andy Pickering.​[17]​ Let us take a deep breath and sidestep this problem altogether. Suppose that we can agree upon data. Does this suffice to achieve unique models of reality? If the language we use to express our data and theories contains ambiguities then of course these ambiguities alone allow us to claim that multiple models are possible. So the challenge lies in making Multiplicity plausible when the language is unambiguous. 
    Scientific Laws need to be stated in a language---all natural language carries an ambiguity, and we may not be aware of where the ambiguity lies.​[18]​  If we seek to purify our language to attain precision, we may as well go to the extreme and examine logic and mathematics. The most reasonable candidate for such an unambiguous language is First order Predicate Logic​[19]​. It is known to be both consistent and complete. And it is the only logic with these vital properties. As stated by Hilbert in the Introduction to the classic text​[20]​,
The purpose of the symbolic language in mathematical logic is to achieve in logic what it has achieved in mathematics, namely, an exact scientific treatment of its subject matter. The logical relations which hold with regard to judgements, concepts,etc., are represented by formulas whose interpretation is free from the ambiguities so common in ordinary language.
The next step lies in looking at axiomatics and scientific theory. There has been an inexorable move towards taking equations to be the reality of any scientific theory. When Campbell wrote that we can filter out an acceptable theory from among many by using our intuition about what it means to explain, he was already long out of touch with what counted for ‘explanation’ in physics​[21]​. When Newton wrote his Principia, the notion of action at a distance was vigorously disputed; indeed Newton himself was unhappy about it. But the equations of Newton worked wonderfully, so Newton’s ideas became firmly entrenched. When Maxwell produced his equations of electromagnetism, many objected again and asked what the equations meant. It did not matter. The equations worked and so Maxwell’s theories were established. The whole process was repeated yet again for Schrodinger, whose equations turned particles into waves (and particles again), but, since the equations worked, a new branch of Physics was established. It is then a matter of historical fact that modern Physics is mathematical ​[22]​.
It is also widely agreed that Science is a search for unity in diversity, a way to show how so many seemingly disparate phenomena arise form a few causes. If we start ab initio, such a desire does not logically entail axiomatics , but since several parts of sci are now clearly mathematical,--- indeed they seem utterly dependendent on their mathematical form, with direct physical intuition being quite helpless in the micro world of quantume or in the macro world of relativity,--- the unified explanation of Science must be mathematical also. Popular accounts have known this for decades. ​[23]​
The modern physicist has done away with naïve mechanical models and believes that truth is to be found in logical, mathematical structures, no matter how bizarre and uncommonsensical they seem, no matter whether we will ever be able to perceive the purity of the structure directly. (page 18)
Modern Particle physics is, in a literal sense, incomprehensible.  It is grounded not in the tangible and testable notions of objects and points and pushes and pulls but in a sophisticated and indirect mathematical language of fields and interactions and wave-functions. (page 18)
If a vacuum means a space empty of heat and particles, then this is a vacuum, even though it contains energy.  As seems to be happening with increasing frequency, we must accept the consequences of mathematical theories as they are, and learn to live them as best we can.  If that means allowing a vacuum to possess an energy, then so be it.  We can call it something other than a vacuum if we wish, but the consequences will be the same. (page 175)
So the mathematics is the Science. Looking at the myriad of facts surrounding us we seek to get a unified way of grasping their existence and properties. the experience of the last three centuries shows us that the world of the physicists takes the following as true; if you can give us equations that are consistent with the data, ---the data appear as a consequence of the axioms,---- then you have an explanation for the data. This point is of fundamental importance and yet philosophers of science appear to keep referring to ‘non-formal constraints’ in their attempts to select 'good' theories.


III. Why Mathematical Logic?
The point of turning to Mathematical Logic is to be able to consider the entire collection of consequences generated by a theory​[24]​, where a theory is taken as an axiomatic system. In other words, the goal is to consider the entire axiom system embodying a set of beliefs about the world, the axioms as well as all their consequences, as one enormous 'super-fact'. The individual data that we wish to explain are all sentences in some common language we share---the language in which the axioms and their consequences are expressed. The ‘explanation’ for these data---the sentences--- comes from the model which generates these sentences​[25]​. Some philosophers, such as Hilary Putnam, have seen the radical implications of non-categoricity for Philosophy, but the implications for the philosophy of Science have not been elaborated. 
Let us take the claim of making an axiomatic science seriously​[26]​. Consider the integers 1,2,3,…to be denoted by N. Suppose we wrote down, in some precise mathematical language, all the true sentences about N we could think of. Will it be possible for some set other than N to satisfy all these sentences that were true for N? Yes! It will be possible to find another such set. This is what is meant by saying that our models of the number system are not categorical.​[27]​ If we could prove all the consequences of a given axiomatic system, where would this lead us ? In order to answer this question, we need to characterise all the results we can get from an axiomatic system---not just get individual results. It is in order to attain a vantage point which will allow us to view all the results that can be proved by an axiomatic system that we turn to Mathematical Logic. This was one of Hilbert’s goals​[28]​:
This calculus makes possible a successful attack on problems whose nature precludes their solution by purely intuitive logical thinking. Among these, for instance, is the problem of characterizing those statements which can be deduced from given premises
As an axiomatic system has to imply the data it wishes to explain, all such data are implications—theorems—of our axiomatic system. The force of the argument from Mathematical logic lies in the claim that, even when we add an indefinite number of data, and the sheer volume of items in the explanandum overwhelms us, multiple explanations do exist. If they did not, the underlying theories would be unique ie as logicians say, the models would be categorical---and we know this cannot be the case.
Set Theory is the most basic of subjects and yet it serves to pose questions of far-reaching importance. A set is any collection of distinguished objects. To define a set, all we need to do is to be able to say of any given object whether or not it belongs to the set. Almost at the start of the program for axiomatising Set Theory Skolem emphasized the profound fact that the axioms of Set Theory do not serve to pin down the objects to which they refer to. In the words of Hilary Putnam​[29]​. 
What Skolem really pointed out is this:  no interesting theory (in the sense of first-order theory) can, in and of itself, determine its own objects up to isomorphism.  And Skolem’s argument can be extended as we saw, to show that if theoretical constraints don’t determine reference, then the addition of operational constraints won’t do it either.  
Later, Putnam elaborates upon his extension of Skolem:” no matter what operational and theoretical constraints our practices may impose on our use of a language, there are always infinitely many different reference relations (different ‘satisfaction relations’, in the sense of formal semantics, or different correspondences) which satisfy all of the constraints.”​[30]​
So how would it work in the case of Physics? Take an axiomatic system which represents our beliefs about Physics.(or some part of it)---this is the theory at hand. To 'explain' has been taken to mean that the data of interest can be deduced from the axioms of the system; so the sum total of all the deductions from an axiomatic system comprehends all the data the theory can explain.
Throw in all the deductions from the axioms along with the axioms into one set---this  set  can be expressed as an infinite collection of (consistent) sentences in the predicate calculus.Will there be only one model ('collection of objects') which satisfies this consistent set of sentences? If the answer is yes, we have a categorical system. But logicians tell us that such categorical models almost never exist for any non-trivial systems.
Turn now to the Continuum hypothesis(as will be clear from what follows, we do not even need to know what this precisely is!). Can we prove that the Continuum hypothesis is true? So far no one has been able to do so. Instead, we have begun by showing that the Continuum hypothesis is consistent with the axioms of Set Theory(Godel,1940); later, we have been able to show that the negation of the Continuum hypothesis is also consistent with the axioms of Set Theory(Cohen,1963). So we have a simply posed, specific mathematical question, the Continuum hypothesis, and we answer it by saying " It does not matter whether we answer yes or no---in either case there is no loss of consistency". Some natural mathematical statements or queries are independent of the mathematical framework we have created.​[31]​
These two facts---the absence of categoricity and the failure of completeness--- suggest ways to make any subject other than Mathematics, call it Z, potentially arbitrary; First, even if we list all the true statements about Z, there can still be two or more collections of objects that satisfy these true statements about Z. Secondly, by analogy with the Continuum hypothesis about sets, all the consistent statements we make about Z could still remain consistent if we add a new statement "X is true"(accept the Continuum hypothesis), or its negation, "X is not true" (deny the Continuum hypothesis).​[32]​
Those outside mathematics may still consider such results to be esoteric and irrelevant to our use of mathematics as a sure foundation for knowledge. But this would be a mistake, and it is the mathematicians themselves who are the proper witnesses on this issue. Set theory was supposed to provide a stable foundation for mathematics. With the independence results of recent decades, particularly those of  Cohen, the unity of mathematics has been threatened.​[33]​  In 1967, after a lifetime spent on foundational studies, Andrzej Mostowski commented :“Such [post-Cohen independence] results show that axiomatic set theory is hopelessly incomplete….Of course if there are a multitude of set-theories, then none of them can claim the central place in mathematics.”  A decade later Jean Dieudonne added:” Beyond classical analysis (based on the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms supplemented by the Denumerable Axiom of Choice), there is an infinity of different possible mathematics, and for the time being no definitive reason compels us to choose one of them rather than another.” Whether the unity of mathematics is eventually restored remains to be seen, but those outside the field perhaps take too shallow a view when they argue that mathematisation will bring sure knowledge. 
	It will be convenient to recapitulate the lessons from logic for the Multiplicity thesis. Consider the following time sequence:
At time zero we know a collection of data F0; theories T01, T02, T03 and T04 account for all the data in F0
At time one we know a collection of data F1; theories  T11, T12 and T13 account for all the data in F1
At time two we know a collection of data F2; theories T21, T22, T23, T24, T25 account for all the data in F2 and so on…
Hence, at any point in time, for all accepted data, there exist multiple explanations
That we would expect the data to grow with time and so the elements in each Ft would grow, [so that F0<F1<F2, with an abuse of notation] and also that theories get fewer as we have more data, are expectations I share; but it has nothing to do with the logic of the argument, which only requires that , at each point of time t, the data in Ft be explained by at least two theories, Tt1 and Tt2. No doubt we are interested in the relations between T01,T11 and T21 say----but these are separate questions which need not be answered here​[34]​. 


The multitude of inductions
Why is Multiplicity plausible? The direct argument, a simple variant of what is commonly called ‘the pessimistic induction’, is as follows. What is considered ‘scientific truth’ has been changing. The pessimistic induction tells us that all past theories have been wrong so we can expect our current theories to be wrong also. Let us use this thought. Since the new, ’correct’, scientific view encompasses the old data, the new view would also have ‘explained’ the old data if it were available earlier. Consider the facts that were adequately explained by Galileo and by Ptolemy. Would they not also have been explained by Newton and by Einstein? So at least four theories existed in the 1550’s which were adequate to explain the facts. Repeat the same point for chemistry in the 17th century or light in the 19th century. At every point in the past, several equally good theories for explaining the facts existed. Why should this ever end? ​[35]​  Thus induction supports the expectation of Multiplicity​[36]​. Such a general argument perhaps cannot be faulted, but it is not satisfying just because it is so general. We need particulars for plausibility and this is just what historians of science have been providing us with​[37]​.The best argument to date is that of  Kyle Stanford who points out that, by close attention to the historical record, for theory after theory, in field after field, we can find alternatives to the (subsequently chosen) orthodox view. This is all one can mean by having historical support for ones viewpoint. Stanford builds upon Sklar’s concept of transient underdetermination, which arises when the actual evidence we have at hand does not suffice to distinguish between theories​[38]​. Sklar intends this to be the phase when scientists are temporarily undecided about which theory to choose; Stanford extends the usage to argue that we are, so to speak, always in a state of transient underdetermination. Stanford points out that as long as transient underdetermination is a recurrent phenomenon, it poses a serious problem and then goes on to argue that the historical record supports the claim that transisent underdetermination is real and persistent.​[39]​
This important claim is then supported by a variety of well-chosen instances which, so to
speak, complete the induction.​[40]​.
For example, in the historical progression from Aristotelian to Cartesian to Newtonian to contemporary mechanical theories, the evidence available at the time each earlier theory was accepted offered equally strong support to each of the (then-unimagined) later alternatives.  The same pattern would seem to obtain in the historical progression [in chemistry and biology] …. and so on in a seemingly endless array of theories, the evidence for each of which ultimately turned out to support one or more unimagined competitors just as well.  Thus, the history of scientific inquiry offers a straightforward inductive rationale for thinking that there typically are alternatives to our best theories equally well-confirmed by the evidence, even when we are unable to conceive of them at the time. 
To those who ask, “If multiple models are so readily available, why is it so hard to construct even one?”, the answer from the history of science is direct: every subject in which accepted theories have changed over time provides us with an example. Quantum theory today can explain everything atomic theory did in 1850. So, if someone had thought of quantum theory in 1850, it would explain exactly the data that the atomic theory of 1850 did. Hence, the ghost of Multiplicity is evident throughout history.  
	Mathematical logic provides a simple criterion to decide whether any axiomatised system will give rise to a unique model---categoricity---and the negative answer from the logicians is that categorical axiomatic systems are not to be had; the history of science provides a multitude of examples from the past when multiplicity can be obtained. This should really complete the argument. But as we all share the belief that our own times are somehow privileged, our most intense concern is generally with finding multiplicity in our own time. “Where are the alternatives to the generally accepted scientific theories of today?”---this is a fair question but It deals with the psychology and sociology of acceptable beliefs, and not with the history or logic of Science .The next section addresses the many obstacles that deflect attention from Multiplicity in our own days. 
It is frequently stated that there can be alternative models for the same formalism and that this fact causes no conceptual difficulty. There is no ground for dissent as long as the equations to be used for experiment and prediction are the same. This Is the same argument described at the end of section 2 where It was shown that,as far as the practice of Science Is concerned, the equations are the theory. The Interpretive questions that arise can be usefully studied from the graphical account  presented by Richard Feynman, when describing how natural phenomena can be described by Newton’s law, or as a minimum principle, or as a local field​[41]​
in the particular case I am talking about the theories are exactly equivalent.  Mathematically each of the three different formulations, Newton’s law, the local field method and the minimum principle, gives exactly the same consequences.  What do we do then?  You will read in all the books that we cannot decide scientifically on one or the other.  That is true.  They are equivalent scientifically.  It is impossible to make a decision, because there is no experimental way to distinguish between them if all the consequences are the same.  But psychologically they are very different in two ways.  First, philosophically you like them or do not like them; and training is the only way to beat that disease.  Second, psychologically they are different because they are completely unequivalent when you are trying to guess new laws.

But what can it mean to say that the same formalism has several conceptual representations?​[42]​ Is it not the same as the point about the existence of multiple ways of looking at the world---models---for the same set of data. Suppose now that the local approach via differential equations and the global one via the Calculus of variations fails to coincide for some new (discontinuous) phenomena? Mathematical physicists will seek out a new formalism within which both views agree. But this suffices to establish the point of Multiplicity---different worldviews about the physical universe can and do exist, even though for considerable stretches of time or abundant bodies of data, both worldviews provide us with identical predictions about the material world.​[43]​ Feynman himself notes, in the very next paragraph, the importance of the different worldviews​[44]​ 
As long as physics is incomplete, and we are trying to understand the other laws, then the different possible formulations may give clues about what might happen in other circumstances. In that case they are no longer equivalent psychologically, in suggesting to us guesses about what the laws might look like in a wider situation
Suppose three contrary data come to light. The solution to each contrary fact is found by using a different metaphysical story---Newton’s law, Minimum Principle and Field theory---are we not back to the puzzle posed by Multiplicity? And what guarantee do have that a situation cannot occur?
It so happens that the standard story of Feynman is not entirely accurate. It is true that one can reformulate Newtonian mechanics in terms of Lagrangians, and the two approaches give identical results, but in some sense this depends on the fact that you already have an independent confirmation of Newton's laws, and believe them.  But in more modern and speculative field theories where we don't have the experimentally confirmed laws, the standard procedure is to write down a Lagrangian and derive the equations of motion. How do we know these are the correct dynamical equations?  We do not have the equivalent of Newton's laws to compare them with. A specific example of inequivalence is found in cosmology, where the surface term (in the appropriate integral) does not vanish in Class B models, so the Lagrangian does not work for such models. A  splendid article by Rothman and Ellis provides a popular account of several different cosmological theories, and illustrates how each is in conformity with the core data scientists agree upon. To add force to this argument, Lyre and Eynck (2003) provide us with four empirically equivalent versions of general relativity. 
T1: standard general relativity in pseudo-Riemannian spacetime (standard GR)
T2: Lorentz-invariant gravitational theory in flat spacetime (flat GR)
T3: gauge theory of the Lorentz group (rotational GT)
T4: gauge theory of the translation group (translational GT)




Where are the alternatives lurking today?
A simple example will give the flavor of Multiplicity: if we have a collection of points, however large, it is always possible to draw many different curves (possible an infinity of such curves) all of which ‘fit’ the data, in the sense of going through all the given points. We typically finesse the indeterminacy of such curve fitting by asking for the curves to be of a particular type, such as ’polynomial’, or to contain a minimum number of parameters, and so on, in order to get a unique curve. But this cannot hide the fact that ‘reality’ is under no constraint to be polynomial and hence that there really are an infinity of possible curves for our points----which can be read, in terms of our original hypothesis, as, “an infinity of possible explanations for our facts”. 
The above example is a trivial variation of one used by Henri Poincare, who wrote as though the indeterminacy could be taken as a general phenomenon; he was not worried by it because he felt that considerations of ‘simplicity’ served to resolve the indeterminacy for practicing scientists. As Poincare did not support the view that ‘scientific theories are representations of reality’ he was not obliged to do more. Poincare himself provides an illustration of Multiplicity from the theory of light.​[47]​ “The theories proposed to explain optical phenomena through the vibrations of an elastic medium are very numerous and equally plausible.”[i] Poincare was one of the greatest mathematicians of his age and well versed in science---in what sense was he wrong when he thought of data as ‘points’  and a theory as the curve that was the ‘best-fit’ to the given points? 
If we had an algorithm to produce all the empirically equivalent alternatives for every axiomatic theory produced, then one would be hard placed to find objectors to Multiplicity. Indeed this algorithm, or the given set of algorithms, would be a proof [or disproof] of the importance of Multiplicity​[48]​. That trivial equivalents can be provided in no way answers the real point---which is that serious equivalents may exist.[Kekule] Non standard analysis is a sufficient example from mathematics. However, this is already granting too much to the status quo. The obligation to provide a proof of uniqueness lies with the establishment, not with the objectors. And Is it not ironic that very mathematics and logic which gave modern physics so much  success is the very instrument which denies Science its unicity? The theoretical proofs assure us that alternative mathematical structures exist, but how will we find them? The argument now turns on the psychology and sociology of science and requires a study of  the several obstacles faced by innovators in Science:-- conceptual, institutional, and practical .
The first conceptual difficulty arises from the observation that the explanandum becomes increasingly complex. We want alternative models that will fit all known data. But this simple statement hides the important truth that “data” become increasingly complicated entities as subjects develop, hence explaining the data becomes progressively more difficult. Duhem was careful to emphasise how strongly this point applied to data in any developed field.
When a science begins, when it is no different from common sense made more attentive, the record of experimental data that it establishes is an exact image of the reality observed…But the more a science progresses, the more considerable becomes the depth of the theoretical considerations that separate the concrete fact really found by the observer and the abstract, symbolic translation given to it.​[49]​
If we return to the curve fitting example used earlier, the reason why we cannot readily find a plentitude of curves to fit our data is that many of the ‘points’ are not points at all, but sophisticated geometrical figures
The second conceptual difficulty is philosophical and may be illustrated by Nonstandard analysis, Abraham Robinson’s most striking contribution. It arises from the observation that alternative models do not arise of themselves, but need to be explicitly introduced by us. They cannot be made to arise by the use of logic because the concepts are just not there. Mathematics and logic deal only with symbols. Concepts have to be introduced by us to give philosophical life to the symbols. A fundamental gulf exists between those who view the world as a collection of discrete entities and those who see it as a continuous whole. For over a hundred years the Calculus was used as though the world was discrete, even as we recognized that this led to many contradictory claims​[50]​. In the 19th century the idea of limits and continuity satisfied the demands of rigor but at the cost of changing our worldview to a continuous one. It took the middle of the 20th century, and the growth of mathematical logic, to provide us with a consistent way of doing the calculus with infinitely small entities. Now the critical point is that nothing in the mathematics forces the discrete worldview upon us---we have to impose it. Thus, the ultraproduct construction---the usual method for demonstrating the existence of the nonstandard world--- only shows us that if the ordinary view of the world  is consistent, so is an ultraproduct of the ordinary view. But the ultraproduct itself does not speak of ‘infinitely large’ or ‘infinitely small’; this knowledge comes not from the ultraproduct, but from how we interpret it..​[51]​ 
Robinson was led to thinking along new lines because he felt that Leibniz made sense and Leibniz, of course, had a whole metaphysics of monads to support his ‘discrete’ view of life. This suggests that the first requirement for finding the alternative structures is a motive for finding them. Not that a motive alone will supply a theory, that would trivialize science, but, psychologically speaking, it seems to be a necessary condition. This motivation can arise from economic or sociological reasons, but these appear to be the less successful examples of alternative models​[52]​. Sometimes a lack of motive leads those who find multiplicity to just ignore the discovery. Ernest Adams(1959) provided an axiomatisation of Classical Mechanics and then pointed out that the axioms were consistent with some trivial systems. Hence, Adams went on to say that we have to speak of the”intended” model when we axiomatise​[53]​. But what if there also non-trivial and unintended models? How can we know that this is not the case, since we lack categoricity? A speculative thought may help to highlight the importance of the issues. Lee Smolin suggests in an online article that closer examination of subatomic phenomena may reveal that space is discrete, as quantum gravity suggests, which in turn may imply that Lorenz symmetery is violated, which in turn will return us to a pre-relativity theoretical framework. If this really is so, then Nonstandard analysis may well have a more considered impact upon Physics itself​[54]​.
There are sound practical reasons for the unavailability of alternative theories. The basic point is that scientific theories are socially constructed. They need groups of like-minded people who wish to establish a paradigm and they need the funding to provide the experimental support for their alternative view. When Newton and Huygens disputed about the corpuscular and wave theories of light, there was very little theoretical structure and the experiments could be performed by most interested amateurs. The very growth of a particular view of Science has made the start-up costs of any alternative view practically unbearable. The possibilities for multiple solutions in Physics cannot be gauged until we see that this demand possibly involves new mathematics, compatible with the alternative ideas, and suitable funding to implement the new ideas​[55]​. It may be that exactly the same observable fact can be generated by two different worldviews but neither the necessary mathematics nor the experiments (which could be very different) will be generated unless the alternate view gets a foothold. 
The transparency of Science is Its greatest justification. Anyone is welcome to produce data which contradict a theory.. But for such transparency to be effective requires a clear distinction between data and theory and an equally clear verdict from experiment, In particular, from the crucial experiment which allows us to sift between theories. Once the data- theory dichotomy Is successfully challenged, once the ability to define crucial experiment Is doubted, once the possibilty of obtaining the exact measurement Is questioned, then these uncertainties compound the reasons for accepting Multiplicity.​[56]​ Science is presented as that which makes sense of the patient accumultion of objective data by filtering out good theories by means of crucial experiments . The sociological critique tells us that this view cannot be defended; hence we are much more ready to believe that alternatives may well be there If only we are willing to search hard enough. 
The practical economics of Science---the nitty-gritty of surviving and flourishing---  tells us not to worry about the multiplicity of models so long as the practical effects desired by sponsors are obtainable. This is an enormously successful view, which may be called ‘Science is Engineering’. So the challenge to standard models typically comes from some form of philosophical ‘deviance’. Who will provide the resources to find that which promises no practical return---just to show that we can think otherwise? Fortunately, some historians of science are thus motivated. A detailed study of the process by which a theory in Quantum mechanics was established leads James Cushing to the conclusion that a successful theory is an indeterminate affair since “the historical record indicates that a rearrangement of highly contingent factors could plausibly have led to a radically different scientific theory and world view “​[57]​.Why would the scientific community want to advertise the fact that there may be two respectable scientific views when funding is already tight? And why would a pragmatic public want to hear of an alternative science that does not promise different predictions? The institutional constraint means that doubts about multiple models--- or incomplete systems or unprovable mathematical results​[58]​--- simply get swallowed in the desire to produce more ‘science
It requires a certain philosophic intensity to want to pursue such questions. Poincare’s version of "special relativity" was created independently of Einstein and has all the same equations, but certainly not the same physical interpretation that Einstein gave them.​[59]​ Does it matter? The only way such transitional multiplicities would not matter In the long run would be if there were some uniquely reachable world out there. Perhaps there is, but how can we prove this? Who knows how long It will be before we get to the long-run? And what are we supposed to believe in the mean time? There Is an asymmetry between Multiplicity and Realism . The realists need to argue that new knowledge will be encompassed within the same model​[60]​ Believers In Multiplicity only require that multiple theories  (that are observationally equivalent) exist at each point of time. Multiplicity In no way requires that today’s theory  persists into tomorrow---this may happen, but the persisitence is In no way required.
It is instructive to see how some influential realists, such as Laudan and Leiplin(1993), fail to see the force of Underdetermination (Multiplicity) in their famous article. Half of section 1 deals with the fluctuating nature of data. This is irrelevant to Multiplicity. Whatever your choice of data, if it is consistent, Multiple models arise.Since we have no obligation to carry over yesterday’s multiple models into today, the rest of section 1 is irrelevant also. Section 2  uses philosophical vocabulary to drape the idea that analogies and singular events should influence our acceptance of theories. True. Analogies do influence us in choosing between observationally equivalent theories. But analogies are convincing for a variety of psychological and sociological reasons. They do little to remove the reality of Multiplicity, except perhaps in closely defined cultural contexts​[61]​. The attitude of realists towards 'non-formal constraints' is peculiar. Who applies these non-formal constraint's? is this not the entry for personal prejudice---as with Einstien on the Big bang or on quantum mechanics? who agrees to these constraints? even if all scientists agree to them, is this not making science the preserve of an elite? and what if all scientists are not unanimous? have we not admitted to multiplicity by another route? It is strange to think that the Transparency of Science , the virtue that is supposed to make Science the bearer of civilisation, can be surrendered so easily.
If realism is not true, we are told, then our ability to manipulate atoms in cyclotrons is a miracle. One could grind the same organ by having Ptolemy ask after predicting an eclipse."It is a miracle if epicycles are not true" or Newton after the discovery of Neptune "It is a miracle if forces cannot act at a distance according to the inverse square law" and so on. In truth, the force of the ‘miracle’ argument lies entirely in finding phenomena that make us gasp and then using our surprise to establish a point where logic fails to be compelling. Everyone resorts to it, but it should be recognized for what it is. Realism has a simple task: give us plausible grounds, based on the idea that Science is intensely mathematical and cannot be formulated without highly complex equations, to believe that these equations will be satisfied by some uniquely defined entities. The verdict of mathematical logic is negative; why should we believe realism?








	The model of science which sees itself as embodying a uniquely true view of the world has had considerable impact upon all other branches of knowledge. Few possess the broadmindedness of  Poincare, who saw no fault in working with a collection of  ‘opposed’ models, because each model was only meant to model a part of reality; and a mathematician of equal distinction, John von Neumann, freely admitted that problems of turbulence gave rise to systems where unique solutions could not be assured, and where computation was thus the best guide.​[62]​ The words of Sir Karl Popper cannot give any comfort to realists.​[63]​
The empirical basis of objective science has nothing ‘absolute’ about it. Science does not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or ‘given’ base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being.
What is the nature of Science? As a social construct, it has been nicely explicated by Ronald Giere, who notes the enormous difficulty in giving a direct definition of what is a scientific explanation and opts for the pragmatic proposal that we take the recognised sciences  of our times (itself the outcome of a social process) as legitimate. Thus mechanistic explanations using action at a distance were unacceptable for most of the 17th century, but after Newton, they became acceptable in the 18th century. Not only is the notion of what constitutes an explanation historically defined, but the success of some ideas depends on which of their rivals we have compared them with and this is again a historically contingent matter. Giere considers the usual reverence for science based on an outdated picture of Science as a way of obtaining a comprehensive and exact view of reality​[64]​.
Here is an alternative picture.  Imagine the universe as having a definite structure, but exceedingly complex, so complex that no models humans can devise could ever capture more than limited aspects of the total complexity.  Nevertheless, some ways of constructing models of the world do provide resources for capturing some aspects of the world more or less well.  Other ways may provide resources for capturing other aspects more or less well.  Both ways, however, may capture some aspects of reality and thus be candidates for a realistic understanding of the world. 
This open-mindedness to multiple frameworks is all that is needed to make 
multiplicity plausible​[65]​. Scholars cannot evade the issue by claiming that several of the multiple models are trivial variations; maybe so, maybe not. It's not relevant. The burden of proof lies on the realists to show that every possible alternative is innocuous. so far they have not even seen the challenge clearly..
For the common man, Science matters largely for the effects it produces. Since Multiplicity does not affect any of the empirical consequesnces of Science, to the majority of mankind, multiplicity in Science is a curiosity. But it is significant whether we think of Science only as an instrument. That “Science provides the uniquely defined and correct view of reality” is the thought that has been questioned throughout this paper​[66]​. 
The goals of Paul Feyerabend were quite different, but in criticizing ‘orthodoxy’, he makes many points relevant to Multiplicity. First, on giving priority to the established theory, according to Newton’s Rule 4, even if there is another theory that explains the same facts ​[67]​
The only difference between such a measure and a more recent theory is age and familiarity.  Had the younger theory been there first, then the consistency condition would have worked in its favour.  ‘The first adequate theory has the right of priority over equally adequate aftercomers.’ 
Secondly, on the difficulty of establishing alternatives to established theory.
Such replacement will be no easy matter.  A new formalism may have to be learned and familiar problems may have to be calculated in a new way.  Textbooks must be rewritten, university curricula readjusted, experimental results reinterpreted.  And what will be the result of all the effort?  Another theory which from an empirical standpoint has no advantage whatsoever over and above the theory it replaces. 
Thirdly, on the procedural reasons why alternatives have to be actively sought before their evidence is visible. Feyerabend grants that new theories should not be allowed without reason and also that the best reason for seeking new theories is disagreement with facts.
And so it is – provided facts exist, and are available independently of whether or not one considers alternatives to the theory to be tested.  This assumption, on which the validity of the foregoing argument depends in a most decisive manner, I shall call the assumption of the relative autonomy of facts, or the autonomy principle.  It is not asserted by this principle that the discovery and description of facts is independent of all theorizing.  But it is asserted that the facts which belong to the empirical content of some theory are available whether or not one considers alternatives to this theory. 
Modern Science is largely dependent on Mathematics, and it is the limitations of Mathematics that have come back to infect Science. Suppose that a) Data are  precisely known  and b) Suppose that data and theories can be accurately communicated. These are strong suppositions​[68]​. Nonetheless, even with both assumptions, the absence of categoricity gives us   good logical grounds to claim that our (mathematically formulated) Science fails to uniquely define our fundamental concepts about reality. The argument can be briefly stated again:
If  science is expressed as an axiomatic system 
If  the language used for expressing precisely this science is the first order predicate calculus 
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^1	  This should not be confused with the Duhem-Quine thesis---the claim that theories can only be tested as a whole and that crucial  tests are therefore difficult, if not impossible. 
^2	  In terms of the recent discussion on contingency verus inevitability, the thesis of Multiplicity definitely makes our explanations of the physical world contingent. See the symposium in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. Ed Lena Solar (May 2008)
^3	  I use terms like theory and model somewhat loosely in sections I and II, but provide a more careful account in section III on logic. Jolly Mathen has pointed out that my thesis can perhaps be more accurately described as “the Multiplicity(or underdetermination) of models.”
^4	  Giere,(1999), 237. The practice of Physics is in no way affected by Multiplicity since the modern view is that if it works, it is real--- What may be called “Science is Engineering”. 
^5	  The fact that there are some categorical models is what makes the claim of this paper distinct from the general logical point described by Giere(1999), 237-241.Giere does not make it clear what basis he has for such a wide claim.
^6	   Far more expert logicians than I can ever pretend to be have addressed the philosophy of science, so it is curious that no one has taken the line of argument I am adopting.
^7	  Quoted in Gillies (1993),199
^8	  It is true that boundary conditions and constants limit the number of alternative theories which are consistent with the data, but as long as there are at least two alternatives , the problem remains. Economics provides many examples of multiple theories fitting the data. Fortuitously, Nobel laureate Paul Krugman has started a firestorm by arguing recently that economists have been building on a false model for the last two decades.” How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?”, New York Times Magazine, September 2,2009
^9	  .The point seemed obvious to me some 20 years ago when I placed it in a footnote criticising economics, but time has shown that where I thought I was picking up an acorn, I ended up grappling with an oak. Rashid (1998)
^10	  For an easy overview see Collins and Pinch(1993).
^11	  In a second paper I hope to show by examples from the land, labor markets and money markets that they all support multiplicity. The point Is actually quite readily established as soon as one admits to the heterogeneity of human beings. but that is perhaps why orthodox economists cling so hard to the claim of unicity. Nobel laureate Robert Solow points out that “They [empirical economists] don’t ask themselves---and I think this is the worst sin of them all---whether there doesn’t exist a different model that would fit the data equally well, and what does that tell me”quoted in Blaug,42
^12	  “Essay on the History of Astronomy” , in Essays on Philosophical Subjects. Galileo is probably the first to take issue with this approach.
^13	  Quoted by Stanford(2000), S2. 
^14	  In Forces and Fields, Hesse has provided many historical examples of this process. Mary Hesse, (1974) and (1980)
^15	  Op cit, 25. This may be taken as one of the central claims of  some versions of Multiplicity.
^16	  This is not a defining property, but a necessary condition.
^17	  Hon, 263, Mathen (2005). Pickering (1997). I am grateful to Mathen and to  Pickering for clarification of several points through correspondence.
^18	  The program of completeness can be satisfactorily established for a world that is essentially finite. The manner in which the seventeenth century hoped to overcome this obstacle is nicely expressed by Arbib and Hesse., 149-50. .
^19	  For a good account see Ebbinghaus, Flum and Thomas.
^20	  D Hilbert and W Ackermann, Principlies of Mathematical Logic, Chelsea ,NY 1950, p1.
^21	  Campbell(1957),82-3.
^22	  Wigner, Eugene, "The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences," in Communications in Pure and Applied Mathematics, vol. 13, No. I (February 1960)
^23	  The End of Physics, by David Lindley, Basic Books 1993 The praise of a number of distinguished scientists and Nobel laureates makes the book particularly valuable. This is only one of many such accounts with the same message. The point is also emphatically made by Thomas Kuhn in "The function of Measurement in modern physical science”, essay 8 in The Essential Tension (Univ of Chicago 1977)
^24	  This is the principal difference with extant views on underdetermination, where the alternative models are considered in sequential fashion, and hence will be emphasized later in this paper.
^25	  Borrowing some jargon from the logicians, the sentences expressing our common knowledge, (the data of the world), are the syntactics, while the theories, (our explanations of these data), are the semantics. We want to see what relationships exist between syntactics and semantics, or what is called "Model Theory" by logicians. 
^26	  “A theory is to be conceived as what logicians call a deductive theory, hence a set of sentences (the theorems), in a specified language.” Van Frassen,op cit., 53-54.
^27	  There are certain sets of sentences (certain theories) for N for which the models are categorical, but they are mostly considered trivial.
^28	  Op. cit.
^29	  Putnam, 23
^30	  op cit, ix. Putnam also points out that moving to higher order languages involves a loss of completeness. “Some have proposed that second-order formalizations are the solution, at least for mathematics; but the ‘intended’ interpretation of the second-order formalism is not fixed by the use of formalism.” Putnam,op cit, 23. 
^31	  For a readable introduction see Crossley(1972) . Robinson, “Model Theory as a Framework for Algebra”, in Studies (1973). It is not without interest to note that Robinson began his career accepting Platonism in mathematics, but ended by being sympathetic to the formalists, having his faith shaken by Cohen’s independence results. 
^32	  Suppose all our 'alternative' models of sets were different only because they had different numbers of elements. This is a rather innocent variety of difference, it would seem. Surely we can live with such curiosum. But this mistakes the issue. Our sets have no character--they are really ‘flat ‘ entities---about the only thing they can do as collectives in order to distinguish themselves is to differ in number. That is about all they can do and that is just what they do do.
^33	  G H Moore, Zermelo’s Axiom of Choice, p4.
^34	  The usual approach to scientific explanation has been to seek an explanatory framework that will consider both those data already known as well as those data which will plausibly arise in the future. 
^35	  I am glossing over some inessential points. The situation we actually face involves data of various degrees of reliability, as well as explanations of several strengths. See Maxwell (1998),pp 52-54, for a good description. Maxwell’s clear exposition of  the difficulties facing the standard account has been helpful. Maxwell(2002) provides a convenient overview.
^36	  With somewhat different wording, this also appears to be what Kyle Stanford calls ‘unconceived alternatives’. The phrasing seems unfortunate to me since it does not conjure the right images; we have no right to suppose that earlier scientists could/should have thought of the more modern alternatives. It is more convenient to present it just as a deduction from the ‘pessimistic induction’. As the rest of this section will make clear, I admire Stanford’s brilliantly perceptive study.
^37	  Philosophers in earlier ages were all too aware of such multiple explanations and Leibniz for example chose between them by using the principle of sufficient reason in conjunction with the principle of uniformity.But this Leibnizian solution gives away the case for Multiplicity since these selection criteria are evidently metaphysical principles. Hesse, Forces,158
^38	  This  removes many of the objections to underdetermination raised by  Laudan and Leplin and by Hofer and Rosenberg .See more on Laudan and Leiplin at the end of this section.
^39	  The need to learn from history has probably been most eloquently stated by Mach when he urged the study of history upon us because “Historical investigation not only promotes the understanding of that which now is, but also brings new possibilities before us, by showing that which now exists to be in great measure conventional and accidental.” As quoted by Duhem in “Analysis of Mach’s The science of Mechanics”, 118
^40	  Stanford, op cit, S12. The same point is effectively made by van Frassen, op cit, 98.
^41	  Feynman, 53
^42	  Lars Bergstrom, “Quine,Underdetermination and Scepticism”, The Journal of Philosophy, v90,7,(July 1993),331-358. Bergstrom’s position would appear to be that “If the equations are the same, the worldviews do not matter”. As long as new science is being created, how can we know this? Many people would say that it does make a difference to them whether randomness is a fact of nature or an act of God 
^43	  I should emphasise that my quotes do not indicate that the author in question necessarily agrees with me--- My quotes only show that the logic expressed in the quote supports my view. If the author in question had followed it up differently, the conclusion of multiplicity would have been reached
^44	   Feynman, op.cit.,53. Note how Feynman feels that the mathematics can eventually be dispensed with, just because it requires so much computation. Op. cit, 57-58
^45	  Many of these discussions claim to distinguish between  underdetermination of current theories and underdetermination of a final theory. This seems a waste of time, unless someone can also tell us how we can know that we have arrived at the ‘final’ theory. Our lives are always in transition.
^46	  Lyre and Eynck(2003), p294
^47	  Quoted by Duhem,p20. Suppes (1991) notes how experiments indicate our visual space to be largely hyperbolic, but with some indications of being either euclidean or elliptic.
^48	  It is fascinating to note that the modifications of Mordechai Milgrom towards creating a modifies  theory  of the Universe followed a path of ‘least resistance’---he carefully modified each relevant law by the least amount necessary until he got a better fit. http://technology.guardian.co.uk/online/science/story/0,12450,894026,00.html
^49	  Duhem, “On the subject of Experimental Physics”, 80-81.
^50	  Bishop Berkeley’s critique in the Analyst.(1737)
^51	  Kurt Godel thought so highly of the Nonstandard construction that he supported Robinsons  nomination as his successor at the Institute for Advanced Study. 
^52	  Thinking particularly of Marxist interpretations of Science, Akhundov provides a nuanced account..
^53	  As a student of the logician, Herman Rubin, Adams would be well versed in the ideas of categoricity. The dissertataion of Adams, whose results are reported in the article, dates from 1955.
^54	  Smolin (2003). There is also a very suggestive piece by Doreen Fraser in PhilSciArchiv which makes a similar claim as it pertains to Multiplicity. (I have no way of judging the actual Physics) "Quantum Field Theory: Underdetermination,Inconsistency, and idealization” I quote a sentence from the abstract “There are variants of QFT which are empirically indistinguishableyet support different interpretations.” http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00004730/
^55	 Anthony Leggett  suggests that the Bohm-DeBroglie ‘hidden variable’ interpretation and the Everett-Wheeler ‘many universe’ interpretation are in fact alternative models. “The Quantum Measurement Problem”,  Science vol 307, 11Feb 2005, 871-72. Nick Maxwell also has an alternative version of Quantum theory. 
^56	  The logic of multiplicity Is unaffected, but the psychological and sociological barriers which arise when we try to make the multiplicity real , constantly weakens our resolve.
^57	  Cushing(1992), p 454. Note that Cushing does not claim that the alternative views would lead to different empirical results. Witness how the orbital data of the outer planets fit " precisely"  both Einstein and Newton's theory of gravity for a long period of time.
^58	  Who has a research program following up Godel’s claim that incomplete systems may well arise in Physics? Godel,(2003),178-79. Or follows up the consequences of  the lack of rigor in physics pointed out by Mark Steiner (1992)? 
^59	  I owe this point to Tony Rothman
^60	  . In the language of logic, that all new theories are conservative extensions of past models
^61	  Throughout section 2 Laudan and Leiplin use a loose sense of 'consequence' and they are occasionally wrong, as in the claim that the entailments and the consequences of a theory are 'overlapping'.Section 3 is largely historical and has no direct bearing on the validity of Multiplicity as posited here.
^62	  John von Neumann, Collected Works, VI, 353
^63	  Quoted in Gillies(1993),131
^64	  Op cit 78,79. The nuanced framework provided by Maxwell, (1998,2002) will be helpful in looking for ways to secure consensus, especially in the social sciences.
^65	  Giere actually makes a realistic point in referring to capturing different aspects of reality, thereby ackowledging that all theories seem to present anomalouus phenomena, but this does not affect my argument.
^66	  When Senator Obama was asked about religion and doubt he responded “My faith has doubt built into it. Otherwise , it would be science” The quote illustrates well the prevalent belief that Science provides a bedrock of certain truth. 
^67	  The quotes that follow are from Feyerabend(1988) pp25, 26 and 26-7 respectively. The book of Harry Collins, Changing Order, also has much that is relevant and space alone prevents further quotation.
^68	 What if the desired ‘precise and unambiguous’ language may simply does not exist? see Paul Benacerraf's famous paper,"What Numbers could not be", in Philosophy of Mathematics, 2nd.edition, editors, Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam, Cambridge University Press,1983,278-79. .
